Tuesday, 16 July 2013

bubble time?

To the man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail... So when I first started to ask myself if there is a bubble brewing in German real estate, it seemed at least possible. After all, prices were increasing rapidly, while rents are pretty stable. Surely this is a sign of trouble? Actually, no. I just wrote a small article for the FAZ (in German) arguing that
  • prices of existing homes are still lower in real terms than in 1995
  • rental yields are healthy - around 4-5%, and not 2% like in Spain at the height of the bubble
  • relative to incomes, German real estate is too cheap
  • bank credit is being offered with care -- there are no 110% mortgages to illegal immigrants
All of this looks more like a market recovering from decades of relative stagnation, and not like a bubble. What I really want to write about is why the German real estate market is actually an important source of competitive advantage for German industry... but there are all these revisions on my desk...

Monday, 15 July 2013

Clio's rescue mission...

The FAZ blog has a small write-up about why economic history has become more important in recent years, and it cites yours sincerely's work on Philip II (with Mauricio Drelichman) at length... [in German].

Saturday, 6 July 2013

The unbearable slowness of financial reform

Over the last few weeks, I have been reading Richard Rhodes' superb The Making of the Atomic Bomb. I was also teaching a class on financial crises last week in the BMSS summer school this year at CREI. One of the striking things is how little financial regulation has come out of the last financial crisis of 2007-08. The Great Depression gave us Glass-Steagall, the SEC, deposit insurance, and ~40 years without a single banking crisis in Europe or the US. Today, we are a full 6 years into the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s, and the proposed tweaks and twists -- read Basle III and related regulation -- are mostly puny. Some procyclical capital provisioning, ok; some limits to off-balance sheet exposures, tick. Serious rethinking of maximum size? Simple leverage limits? Massively higher equity cushions - no, none of the above. Debate is continuing... and it has for about the same length of time as it took to build the first nuclear bomb. As an advisor of mine once used to say "nothing important should take much longer than World War II"...

Monday, 24 June 2013

dark side of social capital

Nico Voigtländer, Shanker Satyanath and I have a new working paper about the "dark side" of social capital. Slate's formidable Ray Fisman (when not writing crystal-clear prose, he moonlights as Lambert family professor at Columbia Business School) has picked up the story here.

Here is the abstract:
Social capital – a dense network of associations facilitating cooperation within a community – typically leads to positive political and economic outcomes, as demonstrated by a large literature following Putnam. A growing literature emphasizes the potentially “dark side” of social capital. This paper examines the role of social capital in the downfall of democracy in interwar Germany by analyzing Nazi party entry rates in a cross-section of towns and cities. Before the Nazi Party’s triumphs at the ballot box, it built an extensive organizational structure, becoming a mass movement with nearly a million members by early 1933. We show that dense networks of civic associations such as bowling clubs, animal breeder associations, or choirs facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. The effects are large: Towns with one standard deviation higher association density saw at least one-third faster growth in the strength of the Nazi Party. IV results based on 19th century measures of social capital reinforce our conclusions. In addition, all types of associations – veteran associations and non-military clubs, “bridging” and “bonding” associations – positively predict NS party entry. These results suggest that social capital in Weimar Germany aided the rise of the Nazi movement that ultimately destroyed Germany’s first democracy.
The paper will be out as an NBER wp soon; in the meantime, here is a copy on SSRN. 

Wednesday, 5 June 2013

cool paper of the week

I was in Lisbon last week, for a conference on Political Economy. Danila Serra presented what I thought was one of the most interesting papers. She asks what it takes for people to be good - not to cheat, etc. In many cases, good behavior can be induced if people's actions are observable. It turns out that this effect is not independent of the culture that people come from - students in their experiment from a high rule of law country responded big-time to being observed by others, while students from low-rule-of-law places just didn't care... The paper is here and the abstract is:

We experimentally investigate the extent to which social observability of one’s actions and
the possibility of social non-monetary judgment affect the decision to engage in rule breaking
behavior. We consider three rule breaking scenarios — theft, bribery and embezzlement — in the absence of any formal enforcement mechanism. By involving a student sample characterized
by cultural heterogeneity due to immigration of ancestors to the US, we are able to investigate
whether the effectiveness of informal social enforcement mechanisms is conditional on the
cultural background of the decision-maker. A total of 52 countries are represented in our
sample, ranging from Low Rule of Law countries such as Liberia and Nigeria to High Rule
of Law countries such as Sweden and Norway. Our data provide evidence that people with
different cultural backgrounds do respond differently to increased social observability of their
actions. In particular, while subjects that identify culturally with a High Rule of Law country
respond to social obervability and judgment by lowering their propensities to engage in rule
breaking, subjects that identify with Low Rule of Law countries do not. Our findings suggest
that development policies that rely purely on social judgment to enforce behavior may not
work with Low Rule of Law populations.

intern time

Congratulations to current ITFD student Juan Jose Cortina, who will be working at the World Bank as an intern this summer...

Sunday, 7 April 2013

what does it take to improve institutions?

I just came back from Hong Kong, where the annual INET conference was held. I was speaking in the session on austerity and polarization. Niall Ferguson was at the conference as the dinner speaker on day 2, and peddled ideas from his latest book - The Great Degeneration. He basically argued that Western institutions were decaying (generational imbalances, "bowling alone", etc.). He also showed some interesting slides on East Asian countries getting better over time.

I had to ask Niall how he can explain the seeming contradiction with his ideas from 10 years ago (in Colossus), where he argued that colonialism was a splendid thing because it exported good institutions to "lesser breeds without the law". Now, we learn that developing countries are doing fine without help from those spiffing chaps in khaki painting the world red, while the West is decaying on its own. Niall's answer? That if I had read the book, I would realize that in Colossus he warned that the US was not as good a colonizer as Britain had been. Huh? That wasn't the question, was it? Seems like he just dodged the issue. Well, this is the man who declared that Americans were living with double-digit inflation already and refused to ever say sorry for beiing dead-wrong about his prognostications after 2008 ... Anyway, you can read the resident INET blogger taking up the HK exchange here.