Monday, 15 June 2015

IAS Distinguished Lecture

I was in Hongkong the other day, at the invitation of James Kung, who has one of the most interesting research agendas in Chinese economic history that I know. I was delivering an IAS Distinguished Lecture on the Divergence between Europe and China after 1500. They kindly put up a video of the talk:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GKMnLdDKpt0

Monday, 1 June 2015

when debt is beautiful

debt is awful, debt is bad, debt is too high for growth... sounds familiar? Well, you'll be forgiven if you thought this was about Herr Schäuble and the Greeks, or some such fun topic. Actually, it is much more boring. It's about a paper Jaume Ventura and I finally put into circulation. In it, we ask the simple question -- why did the country that piled up the biggest debt mountain in history manage to industrialize regardless?

Traditionally, thinking about this fell into two camps - those who thought that it happened despite all that debt, and those who thought that it didn't matter at all. The first school - let's call them crowding-outers - looked at lots of evidence showing that government borrowing slowed industrial growth and expansion. Peter Temin and I actually wrote a paper about it, which one seminar participant called the "most beautiful piece of evidence in favor of crowding out" (published in Explorations in Economic History, link here). The second school of thought argues for Ricardian equivalence - people know the debt has to be temporary, and hence they will undo its effects through savings decisions, etc. Robert Barro wrote a beautiful paper with these features.

What do we do? We argue that debt was good - under the (particular) circumstances of the British IR. Here is the abstract and the paper:


Why did the country that borrowed the most industrialize first? Earlier research has viewed the explosion of debt in 18th century Britain as either detrimental, or as neutral for economic growth. In this paper, we argue instead that Britain’s borrowing boom was beneficial. The massive issuance of liquidly traded bonds allowed the nobility to switch out of low-return investments such as agricultural improvements. This switch lowered factor demand by old sectors and increased profits in new, rising ones such as textiles and iron. Because external financing contributed little to the Industrial Revolution, this boost in profits in new industries accelerated structural change, making Britain more industrial more quickly. The absence of an effective transfer of financial resources from old to new sectors also helps to explain why the Industrial Revolution led to massive social change – because the rich nobility did not lend to or invest in the revolutionizing industries, it failed to capture the high returns to capital in these sectors, leading to relative economic decline.
I think the beauty here is that the paper offers a unified explanation for a number of features - painstakingly unearthed over the last 30 years by NFR Crafts, Bob Allen, Nick Harley, Charles Feinstein and others -- that are hard to reconcile otherwise in standard growth models:

  • growth was slow (despite rapid technological change)
  • over short horizons, there was crowding out - but Britain industrialized first regardless
  • structural change was rapid
  • wage growth lagged output growth; counting urban disamenties, workers probably shared none of the gains of industrialization for the first 70 years or so
  • financial intermediation played no role in financing the new industries
  • rates of return on capital remained high and even rose for half a century - there is no evidence of capital chasing high returns, driving down rates of return in consequence 

Tuesday, 26 May 2015

Hello new job

I am starting as one of the Joint Managing Editors of the Economic Journal at the end of this week. Due to logistical constraints, I will also continue as editor at Explorations until October, when Ran Abramitzky takes over... 

Sunday, 24 May 2015

and that's why...

you want the data of articles posted for replication purposes... Have a look at

http://web.stanford.edu/~dbroock/broockman_kalla_aronow_lg_irregularities.pdf

where two grad students found out through Sherlock-Holmes-style sleuthing that a study published in Science was actually (probably) made up 100%. The claim of the paper was that exposure to a gay canvasser changed people's minds about gay rights enormously and lastingly; but it seems that the data were actually taken from a national survey and doctored. More detail here.

Over the years (...) I have pushed for a data replication (and posting) policy at every journal where I was an editor. At Explorations, we are finally doing it for over a year now. I think that I failed at the European Review of Economic History, where we always agreed it was a good idea but then never got round to it. It seems that the Journal of Economic History is going to start requiring replication files in the near future (the policy is on the books for almost a year). Now, it's the Economic History Review that is also still missing from the list (actual implementation score 1:3; policy score 2:2). [update 2-6-2015: one of the editors wrote to me saying that, well, you know, the Review is a journal of economic and social history, and hence, it may not be appropriate to have a one-size fits all policy, such as one that may allow actual replication, but they remain open to discuss this in the future... (in case you missed it - this is sort of polite British parlance for forget it, we think people should not post their data or share anything - imagine someone else might actually want to use it! or that it was actually forged, and cannot be replicated! better to keep it all hush-hush, like in the good old days.)]

If you ask me, in a field that prides itself on its datawork, it is nothing short of amazing that this has been taking so long (relative to the general interest journals in economics), and that half the field is not even going to do the basics. Next time you ask yourself why economic history isn't getting as much respect as you would like... think about this kind of thing, and be embarrassed.

Tuesday, 27 January 2015

FAZ

has an oddly flattering article about me and my research in the Monday edition... sadly, it's gated. 

Thursday, 8 January 2015

Congrats...

to my PhD student Vicky Fouka, who will be joining the Stanford Political Science Department in the coming fall (and because the polisci market closes earlier, she had to turn down her Boston interviews, including at several top-5 departments). Her job market paper is called "Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US Schools after World War I"; I think it will become an instant classic in cultural economics. Here is the abstract:
Can forced assimilation policies successfully integrate immigrant groups? As cross-border migration surges, more countries must grapple with this question. A rich theoretical literature argues that forced integration can either succeed or create a powerful backlash, heightening the sense of cultural identity among the minority. This paper examines how a specific integration policy — namely language restrictions in elementary school — affects integration and identification with the host country later in life. I focus on the case of Germans in the United States during and after World War I. In the period 1917–1923, several US states barred foreign languages from their schools, often targeting German explicitly. Yet rather than facilitating the assimilation of immigrant children, that policy instigated a backlash. In particular, individuals who had two German parents and were affected by these language laws were less likely to volunteer in WWII; they were also more likely to marry within their ethnic group and to choose decidedly German names for their offspring. These observed effects were greater in locations where the initial sense of German identity, as proxied by Lutheran church influence, was stronger. These findings are compatible with a model of cultural transmission of identity, in which parental investment overcompensates for the direct effects of assimilation policies.

Tuesday, 23 December 2014

How much better off are we?

Tyler Cowan has an interesting post:

I say I prefer $100k today to $100k in 1964, that being a nominal rather than a real comparison. If you are not convinced, try comparing $1 million or $1 billion (nominal) today to 1964. For some income level, we have seen net deflation.
But here’s the catch: would you rather have net nominal 20k today or in 1964? I would opt for 1964, where you would be quite prosperous and could track the career of Miles Davis and hear the Horowitz comeback concert at Carnegie Hall. (To push along the scale a bit, $5 nominal in 1964 is clearly worth much more than $5 today nominal. Back then you might eat the world’s best piece of fish for that much.)
So for people in the 20k a year income range, there has been net inflation.
Think about it: significant net deflation for the millionaires, but significant net inflation for those earning 20k a year. In real terms income inequality has gone up much more than most of our numbers indicate.
(See more at: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/12/comparing-living-standards-over-time.html#sthash.Lu1wmUlF.dpuf)

I am not so sure about this. My maternal great-grandfather was a judge and an member of the Prussian diet; I don't think his income in relative terms at the time was higher than mine (and my wife's) combined. But he owned a large villa in Potsdam, had a car with a driver, employed a cook, nanny, several servants, and a gardener. Yes, there was no penicillin nor netflix, but the real estate and services consumed are beyond those of even people with twice our family income... and since nobody else had a car, it took 20 minutes' driving to the center of Berlin. I think the idea that somehow the "rich" have done better is misguided; they consume more services than most, and it is not clear that these have become cheaper.